'A General War Broke Out in Europe in 1914 Because Both Sides Thought That They Could Win It'

The Great War, commonly referred to as the war to end all wars, is a topic of much debate by historians for the little clarity that surrounds its origins. It is therefore wrong to dismiss the thesis ‘a general war broke out in Europe in 1914 because both sides thought that they could win it’, as confidence would have played a vital role in encouraging the Central Powers to engage in war against the Triple Entente, and vice versa. However, due to the abundance of grey area this topic possesses it is evident this contributor was neither independently functioning, nor paramount. Contributors such as the growth in aggressive conduct between countries and domestic ambitions must therefore be scrutinised, as well as the relationship they bear with the notion put forward in the thesis. Only in doing so can a better-informed picture of the labyrinthine series of events which preceded the First World War be constructed.

It is valid to assume both the Central Powers and Triple Entente believed victory was viable in 1914 and, whilst this might not have necessarily been their dominant motivation behind waging war, it is certainly an important contributor to consider.

As a result of vast economic growth during the mid-nineteenth century, war technology and organisation revolutionised in terms of propensity to destroy and levels of production. Such transformation was coupled with developments in transport, with modification to the French railway system reducing mobilisation time by one day, and the introduction of the triple expansion engine in ship building during the late nineteenth century allowing for greater naval efficiency. It is therefore only natural to assume confidence was possessed by the superpowers and their allies in 1914, especially as statistics show the Central Powers’ mobilised forces stood at a figure of approximately 22,850,000 and the Triple Entente’s at 29,315,000, with Britain committing 5.3% of its GDP to defence, the Soviet Union 15% and Germany 20%.

The supposition can also be made that due to the increased levels of military expenditure, both sides had the economic confidence and stability necessary to endure a short war, especially Germany who dominated European industry by 1870 for its production of chemicals and electrical equipment. In addition to this, new imperialism meant many of the European superpowers were able to secure natural resources, cheap commodities and expand their military in the lead up to war, further solidifying faith in each side’s economy and military.

Therefore, it is near obvious both sides believed they possessed the potential to win the war as without this confidence and belief that the advantages would outweigh the disadvantages, there would have been little point in their participation. However, confidence alone would not have been a significant enough reason for war, suggesting this feature relied on other contributors to gain momentum.

A contributor linking to the Central Power’s and Triple Entente’s confidence was the tension and rivalry each side’s military and economic growth evoked from one another, suggesting the causes of World War 1 were cyclical. This process was best summarised by Professor Robert Jervis in the 1970s, who argued that the measures perceived by one country as defensive were likely to be viewed elsewhere as aggressive, consequently prompting countermeasures that would be similarly misconstrued. As a result, a state of unstable bipolarity emerged between the opposing blocs, which was catalysed by an array of long and short-term conduct.

The arms race, a short-term contributor which perhaps holds the strongest connection to the thesis proposed, saw most of its contribution from the superpowers; Britain and Russia (both members of the Triple Alliance), and Germany (a Central Power). Rivalry proved to be most prevalent between Britain (who were capable of building 8 dreadnoughts in 1 year) and Germany, with the rivalry’s peak in 1908-9 seeing naval expenditure between the two opposing countries near equalise. However, German expenditure was forced to decrease in 1911-13 due to domestic opposition over rising taxes. Furthermore, early attempts of mobilisation were made by Russia in an attempt to restore Russia’s national presence, following a loss to the Japanese in 1905 which left Russia demeaned in the international community. It was as a result of the Social Darwinist attitudes fostered during the arms race that enabled animosity between countering blocs to snowball, perhaps even to the extent of war being unavoidable and a supposedly rational next step in the July of 1914.

Hostility was also strengthened through encirclement by Britain, France and Russia, which left Germany and Austria vulnerable to some of the world’s most formidable military powers. Not only this, but the arms race taking place between Italy and Austria-Hungary (in addition to Austria-Hungary’s encirclement) also meant Germany could not rely on the allied support of Austria-Hungary as the consensus of endangerment was shared by both members of the Central Powers. Furthermore, Germany’s diplomatic attempt to negotiate itself out of its ill-protected position failed, as the offer of reducing naval build-up if Britain pledged neutrality in a Continental war was declined. The assumption can therefore be made that because of the triple Entente’s provocation and Germany’s failure to regain control through diplomatic means, the country was left with little choice but to engage in military action. This therefore supports the thesis from the perspective of the Triple Alliance, but suggests the Central Powers, and particularly Germany, waged war from a place of helplessness.

Underpinning the ideological explanations as to why tensions grew was the series of crises which took place between 1905-1913, all of which showing the increased use of military gestures to back up diplomacy. As each crisis grew in severity, military action escalated to the point of the armed forces being put on alert. This was potentially the prompt which created the cocktail of urgency and fatalism most governments submitted to which led them to perceive war as inevitable; a concept also supported by documents published during these years. Not only this, but the somewhat paranoid attitude many political figures possessed over escalating conditions led to the establishment of pre-war secret alliances; secrecy which would fundamentally lead to psychological baggage being brought to events such as the July Crisis, and miscalculations taking place not too dissimilar from those referenced by Robert Jervis. It was in this process that obligations were assumed by each bloc, as their internal alliances acted more as the guarantors of war expansion as opposed to a means to check war.

Conclusively, when reviewing the pre-war climate both sides propensity to secure victory appears to be relatively minimal and secondary when contrasted against the other escalations taking place. Confidence would have still played a significant role in each bloc’s decision to engage in war, but this is not to say each individual government possessed confidence. In fact, as a result of military competition, ineffective diplomacy and crises, it is likely that each country found themselves heavily reliant on the alliance system and it was only through being part of a ‘side’ could a sense of confidence be installed.

Likewise, from an offensive realist perspective it can also be assumed that the superpowers representing each side were only doing so in the hopes of achieving individual victories to preserve sovereignty. It can therefore be argued that it is impossible to attribute a war ambition consensus to a side, as the countries making up each bloc were fighting on the account of selfishness and personal gain.

Motivations for war can firstly be assessed in regard to the Triple Entente. Britain’s incentive for involvement can be perceived as empire orientated, whether that be in defending its colonies against an imperialistically ambitious Germany or striving to annex German colonies. Britain is also said to have felt morally obliged to aid France and Russia, though under the lens of realism it likely this obligation was based more on the need for future support from the two countries than moralism.

Similarly, it is valid to argue Russia’s motivations for war were based on its belief that it should occupy the territory of the collapsing Ottoman and Austria-Hungarian Empires. Not only this, but through occupying Constantinople and the Dardanelles, Russian trade would be more secure due to the prominent levels of Russian foreign trade that passed through the region under Ottoman control.

Territorial gain also proved to be the priority of France, with plans to gain back the rich industrial land of Alsace-Lorraine from Germany being the focus of Plan XVII.

In contrast, Germany’s motivations may have been largely based on urgency as, during 1914, Russia and France were perceived as militarily unthreatening but potential future rivals, meaning war had to be fought before they reached total mobilisation. Furthermore, increasingly antagonistic encirclement and an arms race that was likely to end in favour of Britain meant that if victory was to be secured, war had to be fought sooner rather than later. Annexing some of the opposing blocs colonies also played a leading role.

Contrary to widely held belief, revenging the death of Franz Ferdinand was not Austria-Hungary’s dominant incentive for war, as projecting power into the Balkans and the destruction of Serbia were prioritised in an attempt preserve Austro-Hungarian power.

Likewise, Turkey’s involvement also aligned with imperialist ambitions, but with justification of being ‘holy’. Their aims consisted of regaining land lost in the Caucuses and Balkans, as well as annexing Egypt and Cyprus from Britain.

It is therefore evident that, whilst each country’s incentives were generally empirical, no country entered the war with a common cause or out of a supposed moral duty. Reasons for entering were instead based on annexation, influence and vengeance, all in an attempt to retain and expand sovereignty.

To conclude, the thesis “a general war broke out in Europe in 1914 because both sides thought that they could win it” is of some accuracy. It is likely both sides could predict victory due to the favourable military and economic climate that had emerged by the early twentieth century, which came as a result of the preceding transformation of technology and warfare.

Though, this is not to say the independent units collectively forming each side were of individual confidence, or military/economic strength. The thesis is also too reliant on other contributors to be considered the main catalyst for war, as confidence in ability could only be achieved through solidifying the upper-hand in an arms race. It was as a result of such rivalry that tensions prevailed; tension which also incited increasing levels of militarisation and the eventual belief that war would be inescapable.

Running parallel to this was also the personal aims of each country where, although individual confidence may not have always been present, individual ambition was certainly crucial in forming each country’s decision to participate on a side they believed possessed the capacity to win. Consequently, it is more complex to assess the reasons behind war in relation to the opposing blocs due to the lack of universal interest on each side.

However, it is clear there was no single reason as to why war broke out in 1914. It is thus valid to argue war occurred as a result of a series of deeply interconnecting causes, both long and short-term, each relying on each other to function and each prompting different reactions, perceptions and outcomes which, when compiled, aided in establishing a climate ideal for war in 1914.