How Important Is the Media in Shaping Foreign Policy?

Once considered subordinate to state-centric analyses, considerations of the media have proliferated in line with FPA’s emergence. Subsequently, domesticities have become central to understandings of foreign policy decision making, with hypotheses such as two level game theory, which insists win-sets must satisfy internal and external requisites, reiterating the importance of a bifurcated approach. The extent in which the global sphere operates in accordance with sub-state influences is contested however, as for the media to assume paramount importance it must not only override elite governments, but monopolise domestic variables as well. The pluralist and elite model will therefore be examined, with conclusions rendering the media an indispensable, but insufficient influence that is best understood through conceptualisations of both paradigms.

According to pluralism, the media exerts significant influence over governments and serves as a powerful constraint on foreign policy. This is determined by state autonomy, in line with classic Weberian approaches, and competing domestic variables that function as an extension of material interests. Liberalism advances this notion and draws on democratic peace theory to assert the role of media in proliferating war averse values. Assuming liberal democracies are pacifistic as public opinion discourages conflict, international consensus reflects these convictions as cooperative, rule-governed interstate behaviour deters elected leaders implementing combative foreign policy. The pluralisation of transnational media upholds this institution, as the free flow of liberal ideologies functions as a soft power that utilises “domestic constituencies to force political leaders to focus on their preferred agenda”, also validating complex interdependence theory. Liberalism thus makes valuable contributions to the pluralist model, as it is evident foreign policy can be shaped by media as global networking has led to the internationalisation of values which incite governments to establish regimes accordingly. Pluralism asserts the earliest examples of the media influencing foreign policy emerged from the Vietnam War, as the shift from official news releases to critiques of wartime conduct and governmental disparity meant for the first time “television showed the sacrifice of war”, as claimed by Richard Nixon. This was reflected in the correlation between intense levels of uncensored, graphic news coverage and backlash in public opinion, in which 57% of the population disapproved of Lyndon Johnson’s handling of war by 1968. Proponents of this school additionally assert freedom of the press was further intensified by the collapse of the Soviet Union, as the post-Cold War geopolitical landscape eradicated an “ideological prism of anti-communism”, in turn dissolving alliances between journalists and foreign policy officials. The influence of independent journalism was made apparent by the formation of new powerful international actors, increased intervention in states committing human rights abuses, and expansion of issues deemed worth of press coverage. This era thus demonstrates the validity of claims that the media can shape foreign policy, as the diversification of news coverage engendered by the post-Cold War climate became synonymous with the inability of superpowers to implement coherent agendas that were free of external influence. Moreover, these developments gave rise to the media empowerment thesis, also labelled the CNN effect, which accounted for the growing eminence of media in the political realm. Advocates of this theory asserted the extent in which foreign policy was shaped by media reflected advancements in communication technology, as 24-hour news channels and developments on the internet amplified public exposure to international affairs. According to Steven Livingston, the media serves as an agenda-setting agent which spotlights relevant issues and acts as an impediment or accelerant to decision making. Particularly influential within this industry are think tanks, which comprise of semi-state actors who promote positions that align with their interests with the mandate of swaying foreign policy accordingly. Likewise, new media has exacerbated pressure on decision makers, as the “dizzying array of alternative narratives” reported by individuals often in ‘real time’, prevents government sources mitigating the spread of unfounded information. This is illustrated by restrictions in China, who published their first white paper in 2010 discussing the concept of “internet sovereignty”, and the importance of non-state actors conforming with state laws. Chinese internet companies are also required to sign a public pledge on self-regulation and professional ethics, encapsulating Xi Jinping’s insistence that press must align themselves with the “thoughts, politics and actions” of the state as “media outlets are essential to political stability”. These policies are also indicative of concerns that individuals who are exposed to revisionist national narratives may align with sub-national and sectarian identities. Foreign policy thus risks being undermined by the media, as mobilising the support of domestic audiences is made impracticable by the fragmentation of news.

Whilst pluralism emphasises the influence held by the media over foreign policy decision making, the fact the school embeds media within a myriad of sub-state actors implies that the media exclusively does not shape policies. Contributing to this drawback is the infeasibility of measuring media influence, as policy makers who are committed to rationality may denounce the media to insinuate their psyche is unaffected by external influences. Alternatively, following failed foreign policy operations, politicians may hold news outlets liable for lobbying a certain pathway. Martin Rochester outlines four complications governments operating in accordance with classic pursuits of national interest endeavour in the pluralist ‘cobweb’ paradigm: 1. Appeasing interest groups, 2. Satisfying the interests of sub-national actors, 3. Pacifying multinational corporations, and 4. Consolidating domestic and foreign constituencies. Interest groups and public opinion operate the most intimately with the press, and facilitate media influence over foreign policy insofar that the three variables are mutually reinforcing. Interest groups are distinguished by their mobilisation capacities, in which electoral or financial support is offered to governments in exchange for backing. Whilst some argue domestic factionalism makes little contribution to security issues which are of national interest, David Skidmore maintains peace organisations and defence industry groups exemplify the societal contention surrounding international regimes. As these sectors often employ new media tactics, it is valid to assume interest groups and the media must operate in a mutually beneficent way if foreign policy is to be shaped. Furthermore, pluralist scholars argue public opinion, which encompasses interest groups and technological communication, determines the parameters of foreign policy and serves as a ‘backdrop’ to decision making. Despite the term appearing ambiguous due to debates over what constitutes the ‘public’ and issue saliency, whereby public engagement is issue dependent, Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro assert considerations of this influence are of value. According to their study into Cold War foreign policy, the scholars found public opinion was not only consistent, but generally rational in its assessment of the international arena. Arguments can subsequently be made that the media, as a wider contributor to bottom up frameworks, is important in shaping foreign policy, but holds minimal influence when unaccompanied. Finally, pluralism also regards global structures, party politics and institutions as highly influential; all of which interplay with media to an extent, but predominantly function independently of external variables. Western foreign policy can be understood through Marx structuralist writings, which claim capitalist economic systems serve as the basis for international regimes, and incentivise the preservation of centre-periphery relationships between the industrialised core and ‘Third World’. The stratification between hierarchies of states within the international political economy are thus indicative of foreign policy decision making, as those at the bottom initiate conduct that drives legitimacy and resource accumulation, whilst those at the top shape foreign policy to enable the elite to further exploit the capital and labour of the Global South. Political parties serve as instruments of these interests, as they formulate policies that sustain economic dominance and utilise international networks to “compliment, supplement, or contradict the formal diplomatic bilateral state apparatus”; a tactic facilitated by the joint gains induced by the cooperation of international institutions, according to rational institutionalism. The poignance of the media in the paradigm that advocates for its importance the most is thus convoluted, as it operates deeply interwoven with interest groups and public opinion, and ambivalently at the international political and structural level.

The negligible influence of the media on foreign policy decision making is further emphasised in the elite model, which renders the press subservient to government officials. Proponents insist evidence supporting claims that social media has proliferated anti-establishment attitudes are unverified, as audiences sustain an obstinate preference for regional and national news. Developments have subsequently not been one-sided, as evidenced by post-Vietnam US government initiatives whereby politicians influenced media through deploying ‘embedded journalists’, regular briefings, and controlled leaks. These techniques have been assisted by developments in organised persuasive communication (OPC), which alludes to the management of public information with the intent of distorting news in line with government interests. The scale of this tactic is exemplified by the expenditure of the US federal government on OPC, with communications specialists currently outnumbering journalists three to one and $16 billion being spent on public relations between 2002 and 2012. The American and British campaigns pre-empting the Iraq War in 2003 further demonstrate the value of elite coercion, as the doctoring of intelligence reports to reiterate the peril of non-intervention and exaggeration of threats of WMD would have contributed to the 72% American and 57% British approval rate. It can thus be assumed the greater utilisation of OPC by a state, the less influence the media exercises over foreign policy decision making. Lance Bennett’s indexing hypothesis further contributes to the elite model, as it directly challenges the media empowerment thesis in asserting elites monopolise news agendas and the coverage of issues, resulting in reporters merely indexing events in line with government interests. Contrary to the findings of Page and Shapiro, advocates of this viewpoint insinuate media consumers are incapable of generating informed opinions unhampered by the assemblage of narratives made available to them, as agenda setting, framing, and priming dictate the angles in circulation. Analysing coverage of the Gulf War in 1991, Shanto Lyengar and Adam Simon observed a direct correlation between public support for military action and the government’s framing of events. Moreover, the agenda portrayed by journalists engendered an overwhelmingly pro-war consensus, along with the broadcasting of episodic, rather than thematic, content which placed little emphasis on rationales for intervention as broadcasts solely focused on America’s military progress. Linguistics, airtime afforded to a specific event and fact selectivity therefore significantly determine the media’s capacity to influence. Noam Chomsky advocates a similar viewpoint posited on manufactured consent, as she proclaims the media is steered in support of specific foreign policy regimes so that the general public passively conform. Generally, the state-centric, normative nature of realism renders it compatible with this mode of analysis. Scholars from this paradigm assert the media should be insignificant to foreign policy formation, apart from when it can be mobilised to ensure decision making reflects national interest. Moreover, arguments that media criticism is limited to a procedural level to ensure foreign policy objectives are not inhibited also reflect realist assumptions, as news coverage that contemplates war conduct, as opposed to initial justifications for entry, affords journalists a form of criticality without jeopardising fundamental objectives. Selectorate theory further examines the role of the media in galvanising public support for foreign policy. As claimed by Bueno de Mesquita, authoritarian leaders utilise the media when they fail to secure a winning coalition, defined as the support of essentials and influentials within a selectorate that grant a decision legitimacy. When the cost of fulfilling this group’s interests is no longer placated by the benefits reaped, alternative sources of support are required to warrant foreign policy objectives. To gain this backing, government officials encipher jingoistic sentiments within communications to incite the public to ‘rally around the flag’, as confrontational international operations are articulated as violations to sovereignty. This technique is prominent in states with pan-regional identities, such as the Middle East where pan-Arabism unites states formerly under the Ottoman Empire, providing authoritarian leaders with the backing not afforded to them by their selectorate by arousing support in portrayals of continental solidarity. Therefore, the elite model functions on assumptions of conditional selectivity whereby the media is of little importance in shaping foreign policy, except when it fortifies survival or legitimises the intentions of authoritarian leaders.

As pluralism and the elite model propose equally valid arguments to debates around the importance of the media in shaping foreign policy, it can be proposed the paradigms need not be mutually exclusive, as an amalgamation of arguments is highly insightful. Constructivist scholars uphold this less emphatic approach, as many proponents seek to comprehend the influence of both visual communication and language in decision making. Conceptualisations of the two modes of analysis are thus necessary in identifying nuances in global politics and avoiding the homogenisation of highly diverse, labyrinthine systems. The political contest model aptly hypothesises both arguments with a consideration of uncertainty, proclaiming the extent in which the media shapes foreign policy is dependent on a government’s intent on pursuing a specific pathway. Therefore, when politicians are irresolute in their stance, the press are more likely to sway decision making and, alternatively, when policy is inflexible the media exercise minimal influence. The media campaigns surrounding the UK Brexit elections in 2016 exemplify this as, due to the government calling a referendum on Britain’s position in the European Union, the media were licensed to somewhat dictate the verdict. In an analysis of 15,000 articles published by twenty Leave-supporting press sources, researchers found that over ten weeks coverage of immigration tripled and depicted the topic “almost entirely negative”, likely assisting in the securing of a result that championed tighter border restrictions. It is thus evident when a void in political decision making emerges, the media’s capacity to influence foreign policy intensifies as the press promptly fill this gap. Daniel Hallin advocates a similar viewpoint, as he states elite dissensus and unexpected events constitute forms of uncertainty that expand the boundaries of media criticism, as the press serves as a microcosm of politics. In The Uncensored War, he asserts public discontent during the Vietnam War was not generated by the rise of oppositional journalism, but instead as disputes in US Congress between hawks, who advocated victory at all costs, and doves, who asserted victory needed to be cost-effective, were mirrored by the media. Concepts of spheres are valid in this instance, as Hallin contends when a sphere of consensus is present the media merely mirror this political unanimity, whereas the development of a sphere of legitimate controversy facilitates the embodiment of this discourse in the news. Furthermore, as alluded to in considerations of the elite model, the role of the media can be examined at the procedural level, which relates to the implementation of policy, and substantive level, which refers to the underlying decision making rationale. Dogmatic contemplation of pluralist and elite models can be reconciled through this conceptualisation, as assessing the outcomes of media campaigns on foreign policy provides insight into the bounded influence of one domain over the other. British intervention in the Bosnian War illustrates this, as Nik Gowing argues British media influenced foreign policy at a procedural level as cosmetic and tactical policies that provided short term humanitarian assistance and confronted human rights violations were implemented in response to protests amongst journalists. However, the propensity of the media to shift Britain’s overall strategy of containing conflict, as opposed to discontinuing it, was slight, suggesting influence was held over substantive level policies to a lesser extent, also further supporting claims of the political contest model. Likewise, the circumstances and phase of war covered by the media serve as additional determinants of domestic influence, as journalism’s impact is more likely to be negligible during the pre-post violence phase of war than during wartime, further supporting notions that government officials dictate intervention but wartime conduct endows media. Finally, analysis regarding a state’s internal political system is additionally indicative of the factors shaping foreign policy, as states with public spheres that institutionalise neutrality tend to be democratic whereas, as previously alluded to by selectorate theory, authoritarian states a more likely to manipulate press sources in line with a leader’s preferences. The influence of the media on shaping foreign policy is thus greater in news-based democracies where journalists are intended to perform objectively, as exhibited in telecasts such as Britain’s ‘Channel 4 6 O’clock News’. This media differs considerably from authoritarian, often print based, partisan journalism in which publications are deeply encoded with specific angles, as historically demonstrated by the Soviet Union’s Pravda newspaper which echoed sentiments of the Kremlin and functioned as socialist propaganda. It is therefore evident assessments of media importance must consider the extent in which power is devolved across the press, as democratic states appear more likely to conform with pluralist assumptions and, by contrast, authoritarian states naturally align with the elite model.

To conclude, analyses of the extent in which the media shapes foreign policy cannot be carried out homogenously. Whilst pluralism identifies valid ways journalists exercise influence, the elite model effectively undermines many of these assumptions as it reiterates the government’s capacity to manipulate sources and mandate decision making. Likewise, the multifaceted nature of pluralism itself undermines assumptions that the media dictates politics, as it is evident the press operate in tandem with a multiplex of components. Nuance is thus essential, as it reveals the debate is not pluralist vs elite model, but consensus vs dissensus, procedural vs substantive, pre-war vs wartime and authoritarian vs democracy. The media is therefore simultaneously indispensable, yet powerless, to shaping foreign policy.