Is Foreign Policy Decision Making Ever Rational?

It is valid to assume leaders retain some degree of rationality when making foreign policy, but the extent in which this rationality is influenced by competing variables has been disputed. Whilst it is logical to assume leaders strive for utility maximisation in their pursuit of self-interest, it is equally logical, and perhaps more realistic, to assume actors exercise rationality in as much as their cognitive conditions and historical restraints allow them to do so. This essay will thus define rational choice theory, assumptions of the behavioural school and the historical implications decisions makers face in foreign policy creation, to evaluate the extent in which perfect rationality can be exercised.

According to rational choice theory, also referred to as public choice theory, utility maximisation is at the core of decisions made by state actors, who operate out of national interest in a self-help inducing anarchic, global arena. Furthermore, optimal wealth and security is acquired through preference formation, whereby unitary actors identify and prioritise foreign policy goals, determine policy options and evaluate the domestic means available to secure outcomes in line with cost-benefit calculations, which require the most effective fulfilment of aims at the lowest cost. According to Chris Alden and Amnon Aran, proponents of this paradigm assert foreign policy can only be understood through an assessment of international structures and the relative power of states which, when considered alongside national interest and the particulars of a foreign policy dilemma, point towards rationalist reasoning. The strengths of this approach, which utilises the basic laws of choice to understand foreign policy creation, are perhaps best illustrated through game theory, in which foreign policy dilemmas are framed in a choice matrix of possible outcomes and accompanying strategies so that mathematically derived interpretations of state conduct and decision making can be accounted for. Validity of the theory also lies in its durability, with scholars, such as John R. Oneal, advocating for its importance in the discipline due to the models of complex foreign policy environments its assumptions enable, as well as the diversity of its applicability in areas spanning from trade negotiations to nuclear proliferation. It can therefore be argued theories of rationality are valid in the context of foreign policy creation as actors operate in accordance with their “status and material endowment within the international system”, with the aim and guide to design being optimality.

Though it is evident rational choice theory holds value, it would be inaccurate to ascribe all foreign policy creation perfect rationality. Doing so is not only neglectful of psychological limitations, but also the role of human agency and individual idiosyncrasies in shaping the way an actor conducts themselves and responds to other’s conduct in the international arena. The behavioural school can be categorised into three domains; perception, cognition and personality. According to Kenneth Boulding, foreign policy decisions are the product of ‘images’ derived from “stereotypes, biases and subjective sources” which collectively distort perceptions of events, also referred to as the ‘definition of the situation’. Robert Jervis’ theory of psychological and operational environments plays into this, as actors call on personalised interpretations of historical events and inherent beliefs to reinforce foreign policy prescription. This is exacerbated by egocentric and hindsight biases, in which foreign policy can be influenced through an actor’s overestimation of the likelihood of them being a target as a result of preconceived notions towards a supposed opponent, and underestimation of other actor’s ability to predict outcomes. Furthermore, cognitive variables relating to the ways in which leaders select and process information prevent foreign policy creation being unconditionally rational due to the volume of information available, and the unique ways in which this information is internalised. In terms of information selection, cognitive consistency theory suggests actors screen out variables that are inconsistent with their foreign policy prescriptions by logically incorporating said variable in or, if the variable is too disruptive, eliminating it in its entirety to ensure existing cognitive maps are maintained, according to Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance. Processing is similarly impacted by loss aversion where, because loss is more painful than comparable gain is pleasant, leaders act in a risk averse manner. Combined with the implications of personality which, evidenced in an investigation by Margaret G. Hermann, fall into either an aggressive category (low conceptual complexity, distrustful, nationalist and perceived global influence) or conciliatory category (high conceptual complexity, trusting, low nationalism and little belief in global influence), complete rationality appears incomprehensible when a plethora of personal dynamics are at play. This is supported when exploring political phenomenons such as Brexit; a seemingly irrational foreign policy decision due to the £66 billion investments slashed and £550 million loss in growth in the British economy, alongside the relinquishing of influence within the European Union and domestic, political upheaval. Whilst rational choice theory appears redundant in this context, a behavioural paradigm enables us to understand David Cameron, who called the referendum, may have done so not out of rationality, but because he was historically bound to promises previously made, as well as a sense of internal commitment and fear of being perceived deceitful prompting him to see through unfavourable decisions. This same logic can be applied to Theresa May who, despite also supporting remain, may have attempted to secure a deal multiple times to appease the 51.9% of leave voters and subsequently avoid appearing undemocratic and traitorous. Gender may have also contributed to her dedication to the role of Prime Minister in such a politically turbulent time as, being only the second woman to assume this role, May potentially wanted to project a staunch, resolute image of herself in a sphere historically dominated by men i.e. The Thatcher Effect. This also suggests the concept of rationality on an individual level is highly subjective, with its meaning being historically, socially and culturally constituted. It is thus apparent that, whilst foreign policy making is not always rational under the lens of international relations, leaders exercise personal interpretations of rationality in accordance with social constraints, historical boundaries and psychological dispositions.

In terms of historical boundaries, paradigms such as historical institutionalism also assert leaders create foreign policy in line with bounded rationality, as opposed to perfect rationality. This comes as a result of the limited information, processing capacity and time horizon of decision makers which prevent actors objectively assessing international conduct and designing their own foreign policy in a way that exceeds imminent demands. Moreover, as decision makers are satisficers, not maximisers, states will continue to enforce policies that have previously been implemented permitting they are ‘good enough’, even if the current leader would not have designed said policy. This comes as a result of path dependency and, when relevant, institutional inertia; both of which prevent perfect rationality as they constrain present leaders to past decisions and historical events, and future leaders to existing foreign policy. This is exemplified by the fact that, despite ranking higher than the UK and France in the largest global economies, Japan and Germany are not members of the P5 which could be down to their failures in the Second World War, the Council’s power to veto and the unanimity requirements embedded within the UN in its creation stage. These states are thus constrained by the outcome of previous conflict and foundational requirements of a major international organisation.

To conclude, it is evident foreign policy making is rational permitting the rationalist definition of rationality is cast aside in lieu of cognitively shaped, subjective interpretations of rationality, and bounded rationality. Whilst preference formation is likely to occur to some extent, this process cannot be analysed in isolation due to the multitude of psychological and historical variables at play that shape the way foreign policy is created, implemented and responded to. It can thus be concluded rationality, in this context, is more personal than it is material and subsequently only exists within the parameters of one’s psyche.