Was Distaste From the Metropole the Main Accelerator of Decolonisation Between 1945-1968?

It is inaccurate to attribute the decolonisation process that took place between 1945-1968 to one sole accelerating factor. Whilst the fundamental decision to disengage lay with the metropole, it is questionable whether the decision would have come about had it not been for external pressures. It is thus vital to perceive the process as multicausal, operating alongside domestic reprioritisation, colonial uprisings and international affairs. Whilst the explanations for decolonisation hold pertinence to different years, no factor functioned entirely independently of the other and had one been absent, it is debatable if the process would have accelerated at the rate it did. Nonetheless, distaste for empire is of significance as it was the metropole’s response to pressures, domestic and external, that gave rise to retreat.

The statement ‘more than any other factor, distaste for empire in the metropole accelerated the decolonization process between 1946 and 1968’ is of value as it is evident, following the second World War, the metropole’s will to rule slackened as the empire came to be perceived as a burden in terms of what could be offered economically and militarily, as well as its impact on the metropole’s reputation in the international arena.The inconvenience of the empire was summarised by Robert F Holland, who stated “(colonialism) became dysfunctional to the operational necessities of the metropole”; those operational necessities functioning under the pressures of economic constraints and calculations of natural interest. The metropolitan interpretation is therefore justified in arguing domestic pressures prompted distaste, and fundamentally encouraged the metropole’s decision to withdraw much of their power from colonies.

A growing distaste for empire was present in the emergence of national conscience, where sympathy towards those living in the colonies and metropole materialised. In the words of British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan: “The wind of change is blowing through this continent, and whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact, we all must accept it as a face and our national policies must take account of it”. This suggests Britain came to realise in the decades following the war the hypocrisy of supressing the Nazi regime out of fear of its imperial ambitions, amidst exercising the same brutal colonial power. The ideological struggle against German fascism and Japanese militarism made it difficult for Britain and France to justify the continuation of pre-war racist, imperialist convictions as a global consensus emerged proposing that a country possessing power and resources does not warrant its colonisation of less developed, overseas territories. Furthermore, post-war European governments also recognised that if a colonial war were to break out the people of the metropole, having been exhausted of morale and man power following both wars of the century, would be less willing to fight. For Britain, this recognition, and subsequently shift in priorities, manifested into the establishment of the welfare state; created to tackle deep-rooted social issues and honour those who contributed to the war effort. In its creation, parliament sought to release West European resources for domestic welfare spending in an attempt to subsidise hospital treatment, house purchases and higher education through tax reliefs and student grants. Any withdrawal of necessary resources for colonial purposes (e.g. to defeat Mau Mau insurgents in Kenya) was disfavoured by the expanding middle-class electorate.

This middle-class devotion to the welfare state further paved the way for gradual imperial disengagement, as a shift away from imperial tariffs and trade was evident. The economic crisis and threat of bankruptcy which followed the war also left Europe reliant on the Marshall Plan which saw Britain’s decisions to decolonise India, Burma, Ceylon as well as abandoning the Palestine mandate. This suggests a reliance on American aid forced much of Europe to conform to anti-imperialist, American policy by gradually withdrawing from territories. In terms of France, economic developments in the European coal and steel community from 1952 also made previous worries about the unrewarding nature of colonial development policies seem an increasing annoyance. As a result, upon his return to power in 1958, Gaulle found himself confident enough to scale down colonial commitments following the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC). It is thus clear economic constraints felt by the metropole either stemmed from public opinion, dependency on an ideologically opposed US or the increasingly economically unbeneficial nature of an empire.

However, it is equally important to acknowledge the limitations of the argument through drawing attention to the fickleness of the newly-adopted British national conscience. It is evident ‘progressive’ attitudes lacked longevity as Margaret Thatcher’s war with Argentina over the invasion of the Falklands in 1982 suggested imperial ambitions overseas were still supported. Though post-1968, such actions call into question the authenticity of post-war attitudes and suggests proponents of anti-imperialism lacked conviction as they failed to encourage future governments to adopt a similar stance.

An argument that can account for the areas the metropolitan interpretation neglects is the peripheral/colonial liberation interpretation, which proposes indigenous disorder set the pace for decolonisation and that disturbance within the empire prompted the disengagement of formal control from colonial territory. This disturbance was summarised by S C Easton as “positive action and agitation, including in some instances armed insurrection” which led the metropole to believe “it was better to retreat with the best face possible, salvaging what they could and trying to retain as much good will as possible for the post-independence era”. Advocates of this argue decolonisation could not have been accelerated by the metropole as it required first the growth of nationalist sentiments, and nationalist forces within a territory itself.

An inherent feature of such nationalist forces was their charismatic, usually Western educated (with exceptions such as Ho Chi Minh) leaders whose rhetoric appealed to those living in destitute conditions with the offer of a mass political movement in the future. Those who supported such movements did so as they offered fairer representation in provincial or colonial capitals than local, tribal or sectional pressure groups could provide. Consequently, nationalist leaders accumulated influence by giving communities of cocoa farmers, coffee growers, chiefs, cultivators and urban traders, etc a voice and, with the combination of support from grassroots movements, political upheaval pushed colonial self-government to the top of the metropole’s agenda. Kwame Nkrumah, who established a base in West Africa’s Gold Coast after 1949 by assembling the support of trade unions, farmers, traders and ‘verdanah’ boys, was testament to this as Ghana secured independence from Britain in 1957.

The success of nationalist movements can also be attributed to its contagion effect, acting as both stimulus and model to proponents of decolonisation. This was evident in Ghana’s independence, which sparked demands from French West and Equatorial Africa for withdrawal. The consequences of contagion were also heightened by increases in the productive capacity of colonies; capacities which were extended by rapid urbanisation, social and political mobilisation and post-war acceleration in world economic growth. Such developments enabled nationalism to thrive, and many proponents of this interpretation suggested Europe sealed its own imperialist demise by creating the “ideal conditions for the breeding of resistance to imperial rule”.

Though pressure was put on the metropole by nationalist movements, this is not to say all uprisings were successful as many resulted in the death and destruction of people and territory in colonised areas. Violence stemmed from the use of guerrilla warfare in some cases, but in others, for example in the Muslim FLN leadership in 1954-1956, brutality was directed against those who refused to cooperate. As a result of such absolutist leadership in Algeria, for every European killed by the Muslim FLN it is estimated the movement killed eight of their own. This indicates that whilst colonial liberation contributed to securing independence, the ways in which liberation was achieved varied in brutality with some leaders prioritising their global ambitions over the lives of those they sought to ‘liberate’.

An interpretation that is also important to combine with the metropolitan interpretation is the international explanation for decolonisation; an explanation rooted in the bipolarity and emergence of 3rd world countries brought about in the Cold War climate.

Though pre-1945, it is important to consider the influence of the US and USSR’s anti-imperialist stance during the inter-war years. Following the first World War, in reference to his 14-points, Woodrow Wilson stated: “National aspirations must be respected; people may not be dominated and governed only by their own consent. Self-determination is not a mere phase, it is an imperative principle of action”. The principle of self-determination was also embraced in the 1941 Atlantic Charter, as an economically innovative US deemed Europe’s salvation of colonial influence archaic and the conservation of late nineteenth century boundaries that reserved markets, oil fields and raw materials of little benefit to a bankrupt Britain and economically vulnerable France. The USSR’s anti-imperialist convictions also accelerated the decolonisation process due to the long-lasting impression of Lenin and the Bolshevik Revolution on those who aspired to live in an alternate society. Organisations such as the Comintern enabled ideology to disperse internationally, appealing to indigenous people and providing them with the moral support and resources necessary to fuel growing anti-colonial movements. In addition to this, newly independent Third world states (such as India) exerted pressure in the UN by exposing and tarnishing old colonial powers. Decolonisation can thus be attributed to the pressure put on the metropole by the superpowers who were not only of importance for the financial aid they provided, but also the influence of anti-imperialist ideology which stemmed from the inter-war years. Working in conjunction with these pressures were those evoked by Third world countries, who further sought to assist the process.

Alongside ideological pressures, the cold war made colonial entanglements inconvenient for the metropole as both the US and USSR influenced the process by advancing conflict in proxy nations to assert ideological doctrines. Operating under the façade of necessary global intervention, the conflicting ideologies of capitalism and communism manifested in disputes over countries such as Korea, Cuba and Vietnam. Much of the metropole, who were heavily reliant on American financial aid, had no choice but to conform to America’s attempts of trying to establish a New World Order. Evidence of America driving their agenda can be taken from the Suez Canal crisis in 1956, which concluded British imperial aspirations in the Middle East as their empire became internationalised and disassembled as part of an Anglo-American coalition. As a result of this partnership, which Britain adopted the subordinate position in, Washington were able to demand Britain prioritised the Cold War over maintaining colonial possessions. The role of empires during the Cold War has been outlined by John Darwin, who stated “colonial empires appeared as quaint survivors of a pre-war age, to be quickly dismantled lest they be knocked to pieces in the turbulent wake of the superpowers”.

However, the metropole’s colonies were of some use to the US as, when the Cold War intensified between 1947-1951, the British and French empire were used to obstruct Sino-Soviet expansion in territories on the rim of Southern and Western Asia. This could suggest the US were only anti-imperialist when it suited their foreign policy ambitions; something which could potentially undermine the accuracy of the international interpretation.

To conclude, distaste from the metropole greatly accelerated decolonisation but a large portion of this distaste was catalysed by nationalism and anti-imperialist bipolarity. The metropole was significant in the process as the ultimate decision of negotiation or confrontation sat with them and, if desired, European governments could have taken an alternate course of action that would have drastically changed world history. That being said, an alternate course was not taken as global pressures were severe enough to convince these governments that the undoing of centuries of imperialist power accumulation was necessary. Therefore, the statement ‘more than any other factor, distaste for empire in the metropole accelerated the decolonization process between 1945 and 1968’ is right to give precedence to the metropole; the sphere that possessed underlying authority. To propose distaste for empire in the metropole was the main factor accelerating the process can be considered myopic however, as the pressures put forth by a progressive global climate were instrumental to decision-making.