Was Enmity the Only Unifier of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union Between 1941-1945?

Upon the realisation during the Second World War that it was not just territory and resources at stake but instead the total reordering of the globe, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union band together in the face of Nazi Germany, thus forming the Grand Alliance. Much debate has circled around the authenticity of this pact however, with some arguing it held potential for long-term cooperation and others contemplating whether relationships were merely “a temporary confluence of interest”. Though, when reviewing the three superpower’s unity in terms of previous conflict/ideological values which may have impacted relations in 1941-1945, as well as their approaches to war (reasons for entry, aims and diplomatic strategy), the latter holds greater credibility.

It is without a doubt that enmity to Germany united the Grand Alliance. Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin collectively detested Hitlerism, with Roosevelt referring to Hitler as “poor, unadulterated hatred”, and they believed that the Reich threatened to drag civilisation into the abyss; this abyss being of a different nature to each state. Moreover, the realisation that allied victory was not preordained prompted a determinist response and succeeded in not only uniting the three nations in moral revulsion, but in also temporarily bridging the momentous gap between capitalist democracy and communist authoritarianism. The war was painted as a moral crusade that required steadfast devotion to unconditional surrender, which contributed to a domestic and international consensus in support of the allies. It was in possessing the belief that the war was a moral crusade imperative to the survival of civilisation that enabled the allies to come together under a common cause.

Whilst ideological and political beliefs were not exclusive to 1941-1945, it is important to consider the values of each state in understanding the bigger picture of unity. To some extent, it can be argued that ideals aligned in the cases of Britain and the United States; something which can be interpreted as unity, subsequently undermining the comment. After all, both sought to push an agenda throughout the war on account of the polarisation of politics present in their own states, which had emerged under the economic chaos the First World War and Wall Street Crash brought about. Their current socio-economic climate and overarching values thus led them to perceive war as a demonstration of liberty conquering servitude, democracy conquering dictatorship and freedom conquering despotism.

However, these similarities in the political sphere can be deemed as merely convenient common interests, as opposed to factors which formed the basis of wartime solidarity. This is as, whilst the concepts of liberalism, capitalism and consumerism were maintained, the United States rejected Britain’s old-fashioned colonialism and perceived Britain’s incessant need to hold onto the ‘lion’s share’ of the globe decadent and reactionary. This view was also adopted by Stalin, who regarded the old imperial states as historically doomed.

Furthermore, the United States were also wary over fully committing to Britain due to a history of conflict, in which clashes had taken place concerning land in the northwest and northeast during the 18th century, along with the American War of Independence. This also proved to be symbolic of the differing approaches each state took towards political authority, along with being a contributor to their resentment of British imperialism. It is consequently wrong to assume ideological and political stances unified America and Britain as, whilst on the surface their principles generally aligned, such similarities were not enough to eradicate their turbulent past. Hostility was also felt by Britain towards the United States, largely due to the US’s refusal to share in the peace settlement of 1919 and their war debt, which Britain perceived to a product of the American tariff system. This hostility, stemming from both historical and contemporary events, was too acute for them to genuinely bond over ideals between 1941-1945.

The Soviet Union proves to be a less complicated reflection of the comment’s accuracy, as it is appropriate to consider Russian ideology as a basis for tension for the difficulty it retained in integrating itself into the alliance’s prospects. Stalin largely rejected the values of the bourgeois and instead encompassed a doctrine of Marxism. Moreover, Stalin’s agenda also conflicted with the agendas of the United States and Britain as the USSR perceived the war as their chance to implement their belief system, not defend it, as the rise of extremism in the 1930s provided them with an opportunity to solidify the ‘New Order’. These ideologies contrasted most with those of the United States, hence their armed intervention against the Bolsheviks in the Russian Civil War. These differences ideological differences also made the US reluctant to recognise the Soviet Union’s existence as a state, with Senator Taff stating in congress “In the name of democracy are we to make an alliance with the most ruthless dictator in the world?”. It is therefore near definite that political ideologies were not a unifying factor in the case of Russia and the Western powers.

When reviewing the events that curbed unity in 1941-1945 (as opposed to those which historically took place or were ideologically built into each state), differences in triggers, and subsequently aims, are apparent.

Whilst the United States claimed to be neutral pre-1941, ties with wartime Britain were moderately strong and assistance was provided to some of the allies, but it was the bombing of Pearl Harbour in 1941 which made intervention inevitable for a previously isolationist America. Whilst the US agreed in the Declaration of the United States that Germany was a primary threat, Japan a secondary threat and Italy militarily significant, the superpower focussed much of its efforts around Japan, causing them to become the primary allied character in the Pacific theatre. This was contrary to both Britain and the USSR, who recognised Germany as the prime enemy throughout. This could indicate that, whilst enmity was one of the scarce factors unifying the alliance, such enmity against Germany failed to hold much weight for America as they most likely prioritised avenging Japan.

Furthermore, Roosevelt recognised the significance of international relations. During the war, he perceived himself as the mediator between Stalin “the Old Bolshevik”, and Churchill “the Old Tory”, which fuelled his expectations of America emerging from war as the world’s strongest superpower. He also sought to rid America of its isolationist tendencies in the hopes of securing a world leadership that would bring territorial gain, as well as a dominance similar to that of Britain’s in the nineteenth century. However, whilst Roosevelt perceived America as the presiding power of the Western hemisphere and aimed to preserve this position, he postponed post-war agreements in the hopes of America reaching its full potential before committing to anyone’s terms.

This approach to post-war negotiations conflicted with Churchill’s massively, as Churchill believed agreements had to be made with the USSR as early as possible so that power was tied down and the best terms were achieved. Britain and America also shared little unity over what triggered them to enter the war, and what they hoped to gain in the long-term. This was as Britain entered the war two years before the United States and Soviet Union to honour the Anglo-Polish military alliance, which obligated Britain and the Commonwealth to come to the aid of Poland by declaring war on Germany. Furthermore, Neville Chamberlain was aware that his previous policy of appeasement had encouraged Hitler to declare war through enabling his precarious decisions, as did it become evident that Hitler’s sole aim was the domination of Europe. Consequently, Chamberlain did not have the option of staying neutral until 1941. This may have impacted unity from 1941-1945, as Britain had been fighting two years prior to the United States and USSR’s entry, meaning that Britain’s trigger to join the war, and the nature of this trigger differed greatly.

Britain’s aims and priorities throughout war also bared little similarly to that of Americas or the Soviet Unions, aside from defeating Germany and thwarting the rise of fascism. Much of Britain’s interest lay with the preservation of the pre-war British Empire. Both Chamberlain and Churchill deemed people in mostly Asian colonies to be unready for self-government, which prompted them to protect their imperial interests from the nations of Germany and Italy; both of which were fanatical about creating their own empires.

Whilst the Soviet Union’s war entry shared some similarities with that of Americas as they both joined in 1941 as the result of an attack on home soil, unity was still not present in this factor as up until 1941 the USSR conformed to a secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This enabled it to annex part of Poland and Romania, as well as the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Whilst this Pact was terminated as a result of the Nazi’s invading the Soviet Union in 1941 under Operation Barbarossa, Russia had lacked the same enmity towards Germany that Britain and, to an extent, the US had felt since 1939. In addition to this, Stalin did not possess the same vendetta against Japan that Roosevelt did which cause them to remain aloof in the Pacific theatre, thus further suggesting disunity between the USSR and America.

Stalin’s aims were instead two-fold, as obviously he aspired to defeat their most dangerous rival (both ideologically and territorially) Nazi Germany, but Stalin also sought to expand the Soviet Communist system to control as many resources and people as attainable. Whilst it can be argued that unity came from each state wanting to push their own individual agendas, this overarching aim had an adverse effect as not only did each state’s agenda conflict, but this motive also weakened trust and catalysed suspicions within the alliance.

Furthermore, whilst it is evident unity could not be derived from the alliance’s reasons for entering the war nor their individual aims, unity was also not present in diplomatic agreement. Therefore, the comment continues to be valid.

Disputes and secrecy over wartime policy were rife between the allies, with the United States and Britain keeping plans as significant as the Manhattan Project from the USSR. Unanimity over tactics, mostly between the US and Britain, was also hard to reach as Roosevelt believed the days of the European empire were over and thus took no part in defending the British, French and Dutch holdings in Asia. Furthermore, he viewed Churchill’s aim of seizing the Italian islands in the eastern Aegean as imperialistically motivated and conflicting with the Germany First strategy.

Britain, on the other hand, took a dislike to America’s constant deployment in the Pacific and their insistence of the priority of the cross-channel invasion. A bitter dispute also erupted when Churchill attempted to get landings in Southern France cancelled, as he was disappointed over the impact of that operation on the Italian Front; a location where heavy supported was necessary.

In addition to this, Poland proved to be a topic of much contention for the allies, with Britain seeking an independent Poland, Stalin aiming to bring it under his control and America making decisions based on the prospect of a future relationship with the USSR. Roosevelt was reluctant to push concessions on the Polish government in exile as he had hoped to maintain positive relations with Stalin once the war ended. Conversely, Churchill felt that an independent Poland lay with the government in exile making a concession to Moscow as a means of assuring its return to Poland. If they could return, it was believed that Poles would rally to them as opposed to whoever Stalin employed.

Differing the most was Stalin’s view on Poland, as at the Yalta Conference his demands of annexing Poland on account of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact were reluctantly acceded to; a decision which meant wartime unity was strictly limited to wartime. This unwavered desire for a new regime to be established in Poland was indicative of Stalin’s unwillingness to cooperate in allied affairs. Previous displays of this behaviour were also reflected in 1944 when an American plane incidentally bombed and strafed a Soviet column believed to be German, as a result of Stalin’s disinclination to establish practical arrangements.

To conclude, the comment “only enmity to Germany united the Grand Alliance” is incredibly valid. Whilst attempts can be made to argue part of the alliance (US and Britain) were united in the belief systems they fought on behalf of between 1941-1945, the formation of these beliefs, along with their reasons for entering the war, their aims and diplomatic strategies, differed considerably. The same proves even more applicable to the Soviet Union, who pushed a political agenda which can be considered the antithesis of its Western allies. The argument therefore stands that the alliance was in fact one of convenience, whereby the allies recognised that war needed to be fought on two fronts in order to fulfil their overarching aim of defeating their enemy, Hitler. Aside from this, unity proved fickle and only lasted for as long as each side needed each other to achieve victory. It is important to consider that until 1941, the Western allies deplored Soviet totalitarianism about as much as the Nazi variety, but this should not be construed as something which unified the United States and Britain throughout the war as Roosevelt resented British imperialism, and Churchill was averse to the US’s financial provision and military strategy. Each member of the alliance detested much of what another member represented, which is why referring to the alliance as the ‘strange alliance’ is accurate; it sought to unite the world’s greatest capitalist state, communist state and colonial power. From a realist perspective, the comment proves particularly plausible as it is clear each state fought on account of what defeat would mean to their personal sovereignty and ability to expand in the future. It can thus be determined that, whilst the façade of enmity was enough to install wartime unity, the underlying motivations of survival which were projected in the way each power fought meant not only was enmity their only common cause, but such enmity lacked longevity and substance.