Whether in agreeance with its implementation or deeply opposed to the notion of a liberal peace, it is a topic that occupies much of IR’s peacekeeping debate. Assuming the immediate definition of liberal peace constitutes the intervention of liberal, Western states in seemingly illiberal, conflict zones, this essay will examine what a liberal peace is in terms of consent, coloniality and alternatives to determine the nature of liberal peace. It will conclude a liberal peace cannot be singularly defined, but must be considered from a range of views to gage what is implicitly and explicitly implied, which will be demonstrated through an outline of the arguments on both sides, followed by a somewhat reconciliation of the schools.
According to Roland Paris, the majority of liberal peacebuilding missions since the end of the Cold War have been consensual and requested by local parties following the negotiation of peace settlements. Likewise, he argues they are not predominantly imperialist as UN-sponsored missions are not principally motivated by the extraction of wealth and resources from host states. Assuming this line of argument, liberal peace represents a peace that is more altruistic than self-interested, and gives more than it takes. Paris asserts this notion through claiming liberal peace does not sustain transnational capitalist systems as the flow of resources in peacebuilding missions travels from international actors to the host state, nor has it been proven economic gain has directly motivated intervention. This is reflected in projects undertaken in the Mano River Basin sub-region of West Africa, where liberal peacekeeping has led to the subsiding of hostilities across 3 countries and return home of 3.5 million displaced inhabitants, as well as the overseeing of nine presidential and legislative elections; all of which have been assisted through the deployment of 45,000 UN personnel, 547 of which have died in conflict. This ‘selflessness’ is upheld by the global normative environment which, following ethics of ‘national self-determination’ that emerged in the late 1900s, render colonialism morally indefensible in the international arena, suggesting liberal peace is rarely imperialistic as a state that enacts such policies subjects itself to international condemnation and hostility. According to Paris, even intervention that has been of a more enduring, intrusive nature has taken place with the intention of bolstering domestic governance through offering temporary and transitional authority, subsequently enabling the host state to foster the conditions necessary for an effective political system. It thus appears a liberal peace is inherently benevolent and humanitarian, representing a departure from centuries of exploitation and destruction towards a more philanthropic rationale. Lastly, advocates of liberal peace propose there is no alternative to this method of peacekeeping suggesting the concept is, if not faultless and worthwhile, the best of a limited selection of resolutions. Paris argues a liberal peace, though imperfect, offers a more ethically viable, risk and cost effective solution to allowing wars to burn themselves out, as proposed by commentators such as Edward N. Luttwak, or authorising impartial, large-sale agreements that lack longevity and authenticity. He claims this is because failing to assist states who request international intervention and suspending post-war liberal peacebuilding creates more moral implications than intervening, as non-interventionist practices facilitate the spread of conflict to neighbouring territories and the prolonged suffering of civilians. Liberal peace can thus be interpreted as an approach that causes nowhere near the destruction as its more reserved alternatives. Therefore, according to Paris, liberal peace is a consensual, non-imperialistic practice that serves as the most humanitarian, just response to conflict.
In direct response to Paris, Neil Cooper, Mandy Turner and Michael Pugh have contested positive conceptions of a liberal peace in place of a more critical line of argument that renders liberal peace the antithesis of what Paris describes. Foremost, they argue liberal peacekeeping is often imperialistic and non-consensual. Though consent plays a role in intervention, it is usually granted by elite political actors and is swayed through coercion, corruption, and bias. This is exemplified in the case of Sierra Leonne who were coerced by the UK, a formal colonial power and important aid donor, and US, who drafted significant parts of the agreement, into signing the Lomé peace accord. Both external actors have been criticised for their accommodation of the rebel RUF and for facilitating an outcome that “scandalised Sierra Leoneans”, with the ineffectiveness of intervention being reflected in the RUF’s refusal to uphold the agreement and kidnapping of UN personnel by rebel militia. According to this critique of liberal peace, hegemonic power is reflected in subaltern conflict as major international players leverage their material capabilities and influence to force host states into submitting to less preferable terms that neglect local agency in leu of a solution more beneficial to global capitalism. As a result, liberal policies of privatisation, open markets and capacity building believed to aid in development are imposed, whilst the lived experiences of civilians are rejected or portrayed as “forms of deviance necessitating transformation”. Cooper et al also reject Paris’ belief that liberal peace is non-imperialistic, as demonstrated by the US imposition of a neoliberal political economy in Iraq, specifically in the oil industry. Though the US incurred substantial costs in this liberal peacekeeping mission, it is evident “blatant profiteering by a handful of (predominantly) US companies” occurred, suggesting US foreign policy was not wholly altruistic in this instance. Furthermore, they argue liberal peace is not the only feasible solution during conflict, nor is it the most ethically defensible alternative. This is demonstrated by the success of statist development models in places such as China; a state that is “dominated by state-owned enterprises” and “heavily directed by the state”, thus indicating the political economy of liberal peace that advocates for private markets is not necessary in sustaining economic growth. The assumption that liberal peace is necessary as valid alternatives are non-existent is therefore compromised as key neoliberal economic policies, most of which have endured whilst the human right elements of liberal peace have regressed, are evidently not instrumental to the success of peacekeeping missions. To conclude, it is evident liberal peace has been interpreted in a manner that polarises assumptions of its definition and the morality of its implementation, as evidenced by Cooper et al who assert an antithetical view to that of Paris that renders the practice invasive, colonial and somewhat redundant in a political climate that offers alternatives.
Though reconciling these conflicting notions proves complex, it can be argued Paris’ sentiments are hypothetically plausible; liberal peace is not inherently forced and exploitative. However, its enactment best lends itself to Cooper et al’s critiques due to the multitude of examples of failed peacekeeping missions that have historically occurred as a result of corruption (sex trafficking rings in Haiti), inefficiency (restrictive UN mandate in the Rwandan genocide) and institutional structure (P5 member Russia vetoing draft resolutions relating to chemical weapon investigations in Syria). It is subsequently evident liberal peace as a concept is definitively different to liberal peace as a practice, the former aligning with Paris’ argument and the latter rightfully condemned by Cooper et al. Furthermore, both analyses of consent, coloniality and alternatives prove particularly irreconcilable as both proponents provide convincing arguments. From this it can be interpreted that liberal peace can and has consisted of some or all three factors simultaneously, in instances where Western states have intervened non-consensually with imperialistic intentions in neglect of an array of more justifiable alternatives, as well as instances where host states have received aid provided altruistically in the absence of other solutions. In direct response to the question, too many examples of successful and failed liberal peacekeeping operations exist to homogenise what liberal peace is and what it entails.
To conclude, the definition of liberal peace is thoroughly subjective; a Bosnian Muslim man in Srebrenica in 1995 may blame liberal peacekeeping for the massacre of his community, whereas a woman in Egypt in 2015 could praise missions carried out by the UN with the significant drop in FGM in her village, rendering the practice time and geographically dependent. Upon reviewing literature from differing viewpoints, it is fair to assume consent to liberal peace, the extent in which alternatives exist and its coloniality should be assessed on an individual basis, though it does appear many of these traits have been explicit in peacekeeping operations regardless of the underlying intentions of liberal states. It is essential, however, that the notion of a liberal peace continues to be interrogated in ensuring current and future peacekeeping operations prioritise the autonomy of indigenous actors, and account for genuine, enduring structural change that empowers, not thwarts, host states.
