Why Do States Leave International Institutions?

Explanations outlining why states leave international institutions require theoretical analysis to make sense of the long and short term motivations behind withdrawal, as well as the implications of decisions of this calibre on the political climate. This essay will thus evaluate this decision through the lens of realism, new institutionalist schools of rational institutionalism and historical institutionalism, and constructivism, adhering to the premise that a realist constructivism approach possesses the greatest explanatory power for its material and ideational core.

When assessing why states leave institutions through the lens of realism, explanations are derived from the theory’s sceptic outlook in which they perceive institutions as merely an intervening variable in the larger context of power struggles. Whilst the paradigm recognises that international relations can operate through institutions, it proposes they are microcosms reflecting the larger power balance of the international arena. Subsequently, powerful states establish and develop institutions in line with state calculations of self-interest based on the international distribution of power. If the maximum profits that can be acquired through membership are outweighed by the benefits of withdrawal, a state will make the strategic move to revoke membership.

This premise was demonstrated by Donald Trump’s threat to unilaterally withdraw from NATO, where he suggested the US will “go it alone” if Europe failed to increase funding of the military bloc by 2% of GDP by January 2019. Proponents of realism would attribute this threat to the fact that states are rational, utility maximisers and through withdrawal Trump seeks to strengthen America’s position in the global arena through no longer having to contribute to an institution that fails to prioritise military spending. Historical context is also crucial in this example, as NATO emerged from the bipolar political climate in Europe during the Cold War, whereby the institution was necessary in maintaining stability in the continent and acted as an instrument that America could yield to regulate the global balance of power and assert dominance in the face of Soviet hostility. As political climates have since reshaped following the collapse of the Soviet Union, if NATO fails to remodel itself in line with the current international arena the institution subjects itself to threats of withdrawal from states that no longer perceive it as necessary to their survival.

Though most branches of the realist school share core fundamentals, classical realism posits its explanations on human nature whilst structural realism stresses the importance of anarchic conditions. Therefore, whilst classical realists would most likely support the explanations already discussed as the “drive for power and the will to dominate” are “fundamental aspects of human nature” that stem from self-interest, neorealists might give precedence to the implications of anarchy instead. This is as anarchic conditions force states to leave institutions that are non-contributory to power maximisation as a lack of global centralised authority incites a system of self-help and constant security competition; a threat operating under the shadow of war. It is thus crucial states withdraw from institutions that fail to serve self-interests if they are to negate threats to security. Overall, realism provides a comprehensive explanation as to why states leave institutions and the ways in which institutions that fail to adapt become redundant. Though perhaps neglectful of the influence of domestic opinion and national identity, the theory convincingly explains Trump’s threat to withdraw from NATO and its sub-schools account for the ramifications of power struggles and the structure of the international system.

Similar to realism, new institutionalist schools such as rational institutionalism and historical institutionalism adopt the assumption that the international system is anarchic and that states act rationally. However, they differ in that they adopt a less sceptical outlook towards institutions and instead focus on how institutional rules, norms, cultures and structures constrain the behaviour of member states. Consequently, explanations as to why states renegade commitments to institutions are less explicit than in realist propositions as new institutionalist schools are of a less critical nature, particularly rational institutionalism which proposes institutions minimise transaction costs and assist states in overcoming obstacles to uncertainty. Nonetheless, the schools account for state preferences and unexpected, potentially exogenous, developments and thus provide valid, alternative explanations.

Under a rational institutionalist lens, state actors behave in accordance with a fixed set of preferences and act strategically with extensive calculation in an attempt to maximise these preferences and conform to precise conditions. As a result of this perfect rationality and the assumption that states have access to full information that enables them to optimise outcomes, if the joint gains from institutionally assisted cooperation are not in a state’s self-interest, actors may choose to withdraw. This may come as a result of mixed motive games in enforcement problems as illustrated by the ‘Prisoners Dilemma’, whereby the dominant strategy for both actors is defection. As rational institutionalists perceive institutions as facilitators of mutually beneficial cooperation and unable to force constraints as a result of anarchic conditions, institutions may appear inessential to a state where self-imposed constraints are not in their self-interest. Not only this, but problems relating to the distribution of gains may also prompt a state to leave an institution if the prospect of multiple equilibria in ‘Battle of the Sexes’ dilemmas are unfavourable to a state looking to increase range of agreements, reject ‘package deals’ or receive the maximum distribution of gains; all of which are mitigated through institutions. A state will thus leave an institution if the self-imposed constraints that emerge through the overcoming of obstacles is not outweighed by mutually beneficial cooperation.

According to historical institutionalism, unintended consequences in the creation phase of an institution can lead to tensions in the operational phase as a result of the ambiguous provisions initially employed to facilitate varied institutional preferences. This comes as a result of the bounded rationality of states and the assumption that they are satisficers as opposed to maximisers, whereby limited information can lead to unintended consequences and short-term thinking can prompt unfavourable long-term implications. According to this paradigm, institutional inefficiency proves difficult for states to negate as a result of obstacles to institutional change in the form of path-dependency, by which constraining decisions made in the initial stages prove complex to reverse during the operational stages. These difficulties can come as a result of procedural obstacles, whereby developments in the design of institutions require unanimity or supermajorities amongst member states, which can be exacerbated if powerful, allied states favour the status quo. Likewise, bureaucracies actively seeking to maintain the status quo of an institution can use authority to block change which, combined with the difficulties previously discussed and the fact that most states are unable to make a credible threat to withdraw as a result of high exit costs, can result in institutional inertia. Examples of procedural obstacles resulting in institutional inertia are evident in that Japan and Germany are yet to be members of the UN Security Council, regardless of both states ranking higher in the world’s largest economies than the UK and France; both of whom have been permanent members since 1945. Historical institutionalists would attribute this to the fact that Japan and Germany were not victors of the Second World War and, as a result of permanent members holding the power to veto and institutional reform requiring unanimity, attempts have been blocked. Only when membership falls below suboptimal and dysfunctionality can no longer be changed will a state withdraw.

Though both rational institutionalism and historical institutionalism aptly explain why states leave institutions, qualitative oriented scholars have criticised the school’s concept of rationality by asserting that randomness should be accounted for in political decision making. Rational institutionalism has also been accused of being neglectful of human motivation, whilst the path-dependency aspect of historical institutionalism can prove overly deterministic and too subjective. Nonetheless, perhaps it is wrong to assume schools so heavily concerned with explaining the impact of institutions on cooperation would give the same weight to explaining why states may withdraw; a concept deeply engrained in realist and constructivist theory. It is thus fair to argue rational institutionalism and historical institutionalism possess high explanatory power, but not necessarily in the context of state withdrawal.

Lastly, constructivist theory is of great value in analysing why states leave institutions as it accounts for the implications of norms, identities and strategic cultures in political decision making. The paradigm’s explanations of withdrawal can be best understood when applied to the example of Brexit, whereby the 51.9% leave vote of the 2016 referendum can be attributed to a crisis in British identity over sovereignty. The concept of national identity is summarised by Aaron L. Friedberg as being “transmitted across generational lines by the process of education and acculturation” and stemming from predominant explanations of a society’s shared history. Roger Brubaker and Frederick Cooper also propose that identity can be understood as a core characteristic of collective and individual selfhood, thus placing the concept at the heart of socio-political decision making. When examined in the context of Brexit, constructivist theory suggests that the varied cultures and histories present amongst member states in the EU hinders prospects of a coherent identity and may therefore prompt states, such as the UK, to leave in the hopes of reasserting individualism in the global arena. British Prime Minister, Theresa May, referred to the importance of reclaiming exclusive national identity at a Conservative Party conference; “if you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere”, which took place alongside the Leave campaign that asserted “vote leave, take back control”. It thus appears that states leave institutions under the pretence of restoring individuality and legitimacy; characteristics they can perceive as being diluted by the multicultural, heterogenous nature of international institutions.

Constructivism also accounts for the impact of domestic opinion where, during Brexit, Eurosceptic sentiments gained momentum as propaganda depicting health tourism and queues of refugees on the Croatia-Slovenia border further fuelled nationalist and xenophobic morale. The supposed exploitation of the NHS in this example is of poignance due to its significance in British social history, further supporting the constructivist argument that EU withdrawal resulted from national insecurity whereby otherness was projected onto immigrants in an attempt to preserve an exclusive UK identity. Generally, constructivism accounts for the implications of immaterial factors such as reputation and self-perception in exploring why states leave institutions, enabling the school’s explanatory power to stem from the concepts realism neglects. However, the substitution of material factors for ideational assumptions suggests constructivism risks overlooking the role of hard power in decision making and overemphasises normative standards of ‘appropriate behaviour’.

The conclusion can thus be reached that a realist constructivism approach should be employed if the reasons behind a state’s withdrawal from an international institution are to be understood. Whilst rational institutionalism and historical institutionalism make valid contributions about constraints, institutional design and unexpected developments, the highly deductive nature of their assumptions fails to translate as effectively to the question of why states leave institutions. When combined, realism and constructivism appear complementary as they account for “normative structures, the carriers of political morality and the uses of power” through combining realism’s emphasis on hard power in the anarchic system with constructivism’s consideration of domestic implications on perceptions of state legitimacy in the global arena. Through employing the realist constructivism paradigm, the judgement can be reached that states leave institutions out of survival and dissatisfaction with the gains offered by membership whilst simultaneously attempting to reassert an exclusive identity they may have perceived as being lost in the diverse membership present in most institutions.